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Abstract 
This paper argues that imperfectly informed consumers use simple signals to identify the 
characteristics of wine. The geographical denomination and vintage of a wine as well as the 
characteristics of a particular wine will be considered here. However, the specific characteristics of 
a wine are difficult to ascertain ex ante given the enormous product variety. The reputation of a 
denomination will thus be an important guide for consumers when assessing individual wines. 
Denomination reputation is a function of average quality as revealed by the past performance of 
producers. The impact of past performance increases over time, since producers consider improved 
average quality to be an important factor in enhancing the price, but this necessitates monitoring of 
members in the denomination. The market and pricing of Tuscan red wines provide a natural 
experiment because there are a number of denominations of different age, each of which is typically 
undergoing a process of gradual increase in quality standards over time. Furthermore, Tuscan red 
wines are easily comparable because of great similarities in climate and choice of grape varieties, 
soil and exposure to sun etc. We show that new denominations have a lower average quality score 
and that price differentials between denominations are linked to differences in average quality, 
although consumers tend to exaggerate the quality gap between prestige denominations and new 
denominations. Thus, a producer in an old denomination benefits from a substantial mark-up 
relative to an equally good producer from a new denomination. Since ambitious producers in new 
denominations suffer from price ‘discrimination’ it can be expected that they will produce vineyard 
branded but denomination neutral wines, provided they can overcome the large fixed costs 
associated with that strategy. We show that denomination neutral wines do indeed have a stronger 
price-quality relationship than denomination specific wines. 
 
 
JEL codes: L15, L66 
Keywords: wine, Tuscany, price-quality relationship 
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1. Introduction1
The wine economics literature indicates that what is on the label of the bottle often has an impact on 
price which is much larger than the impact of what is within the bottle. (Oczkowski 2001, Lecocq 
and Visser 2006 summarized their earlier articles, but see Cardebat and Figuet 2004 for a dissenting 
view) However, there are national differences in the sense that the rigid classification systems 
applied in France seem to be particularly biased against quality or sensory aspects being able to 
have an impact on price. Studies of wine prices in nations which do not use denominations give 
sensory characteristics and/or jury grades significant explanatory power. (Schamel and Anderson 
2003, but this result is disputed by Haeger and Storchman 2006). Collective reputation is a quasi-
public good, so in a rigid classification system, as practiced in Bordeaux, free-riding on the 
collective reputation must be higher than in Burgundy where the classification right is evaluated 
every year and de-classification is practiced (Combris, Lecocq and Visser 2000) Indeed, Combis et 
al show that sensory characteristics have a larger impact on price in Burgundy than in Bordeaux. 
The fact that quality (as revealed by the evaluation of experts) and sensory characteristics 
often play a minor role in determining the price of a commodity is disturbing and is not 
immediately  compatible with the postulate that consumers are well informed. There is of course the 
argument that experts’ evaluations or other estimates of sensory characteristics do not correspond 
strongly to consumers’ tastes and preferences. However, we take the view that consumers and 
experts share similar preferences, but that consumers differ from experts in that they have imperfect 
information on individual wines. This is understandable given the product variety of the wine 
market. One of the authors’ local supermarkets has about ten varieties of toothpaste but the local 
bottle shop (Systembolaget at HansaCompagniet, Malmö, Sweden) has about 1200 varieties of 
white wine and 1700 varieties of red wine. A recent edition of an Italian wine guide regularly tests  
about 15,000 individual Italian wines from a little less than 3,000 producers, and the recent edition 
of  Gault Millau Vin à decouvrir, Meilleurs vins de France lists scores and prices of 5000 French 
wines.  
Facing this product variety, consumers may learn about individual wineries, but they will use 
the ranking of denominations as an important indicator of the quality of a particular wine. Indeed, it 
might well be the case that although consumers have knowledge about the average quality of well 
established denominations, they infer that denominations that they do not know of must be of an 
                                                 
1 We thank Heino Bohn Nielsen for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper and Mette Bjarnholt for 
research assistance. Comments at the Enometrics conference in Trier, May 2007, and from seminar participants at the 
Department of Economics, University of Oxford are gratefully acknowledged. 
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inferior rank. We propose that the average quality of the denomination of a wine will have an 
impact on the price of individual wines in that denomination which is independent of their 
individual quality. The average quality of a denomination is a function of time and monitoring 
regimes in the denomination. Since an increase in the average quality enhances the price members 
of a denomination can acquire for their product, members will try to purge other members which 
are below average in terms of quality. There is also a tendency within a denomination to gradually 
introduce stricter rules in the wine making process, as will be discussed in next section. 
Furthermore, it takes time for new denominations to get the media coverage that is necessary for 
building a reputation. A recent Google search for two denominations included in this study gave 
about 1 million hits for one of the established denominations, Brunello di Montalcino, but only 
25,000 for a recently formed denomination, Rosso di Sovana. 
We will expect that there is a positive relationship between quality (as revealed by scores 
given by experts) and price but that there are strong denomination effects, explained by the fact that 
average quality differs between old and new denominations. That is, an individual wine from an old 
denomination will receive a price premium, linked to the average quality of its denomination, which 
is independent of the quality of the individual wine. Conversely, the price of a wine from a new 
denomination will be affected by its quality (sensory characteristics summed up by the score given 
by an expert) but will suffer from price discrimination linked to the perceived average quality of its 
denomination. As a consequence, wines of equal quality from different denominations will 
command significantly different prices. We call the price premium obtained by denomination only a 
reputational rent or mark-up and we will try to estimate the magnitude of it. We conjecture that the 
perceived quality difference is larger than the actual or objective difference because consumers 
have distorted access to information. New denominations have less media coverage than old ones, 
partly because old denominations have higher average quality. We also investigate the nature of 
price formation in the market for Tuscan red wines which do not rely on strong denomination 
attachments – the so called IGT (Indicazione Geografica Tipica) and Vino da Tavola discussed 
below. Although IGT carries a vague geographical connotation, the major signal of IGT and Vino 
da Tavola is that these wines have a much larger variance in quality than traditional denominations. 
The implication is that consumers must learn about the specific characteristics of the individual 
wines. These wines thus rely on linking quality to brand name reputation, rather than strict 
geographical denomination. We expect these wines to show a stronger link between price and 
quality. 
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2. A brief note on Italian and Tuscan classification principles 
Italy has four types of denominations, and the system is authorized by the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Ministero delle politiche agricole e alimentari e forestali), although the body that monitors 
members, the consorzio, is elected by members. The most rigorous is DOCG (Denominazione di 
Origine Controllata e Garantita) followed by DOC (Denominazione di Origine Controllata). A 
denomination covers a restricted geographical territory and prescribes through its disciplinare di 
produzione the grapes which are permitted and in what proportions they are to be used, as well as a 
number of conditions for the wine growing and making procedures. These rules include the 
permitted yield and the properties of the grapes at harvest, amongst others. 
A denomination typically starts by obtaining a DOC status and then strives after DOCG 
status, which is essentially a process of increasing the average quality. Members need to obey the 
rules established by the consorzio and can be subject to disciplinary action. 
There are two additional classifications which cover wider territorial units and which are 
much less rigorous. IGT (Indicazione Geografica Tipica) and Vino da  Tavola. IGT wines are 
subject to a much larger variance in quality and wine making procedures. In fact some of the best 
wines in Tuscany are in the IGT or Vino da Tavola category – as well as some of the worst. As a 
consequence these denominations do not confer a direct signal as to the quality of the wine but rely 
on brand-name impact. Typically, established large producers use this type of denomination to 
experiment with grape varieties not permitted in DOC and DOCG and to enhance the price-quality 
link through brand-name promotion. 
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In most cases, 
producers are both members 
of a DOC or DOCG and 
devote part of the land to IGT 
or Vino da Tavola.2 We 
argue that producing IGT 
wines is a way for high 
quality producers in new 
denominations to get a better 
deal, since denomination 
neutral wines can be expected 
to give a better price-quality 
relationship. It is also worth 
noting that denominations 
that enjoy high reputational 
mark-ups, such as Barolo in 
Lombardy or Montalcino in 
Tuscany, are less inclined to 
produce IGT wines. Producing IGT wines is open only for medium to large producers because of 
the fixed costs involved in establishing brand name reputation. 
Map 1: 
The Tuscan denominations in the sample analyzed in this paper are within a fairly 
homogenous geographical area, shown in Map 1. Of the Tuscan denominations, we include Chianti 
Classico which stretches from south of Florence to north of Siena; Brunello di Montalcino south of 
Siena; and a number of new denominations in the Grosseto province, to the west of Montalcino. 
The denominations are ranked below in terms of age, and the proportion of Sangiovese in 
DOC and DOCG wines is given in square brackets. When it comes to IGT wines, the grape 
composition varies, but as a rule ‘international’ grapes, such as Merlot, Syrah and Cabernet 
Sauvignon, are fairly important in addition to Sangiovese. However, there is no obligation to 
include Sangiovese.  
 
                                                 
2 The wine producing branch of the de Rothschild family (of Chateau Lafite) recently established a  fattoria (Rocca di 
Frassinello) in the Grosseto province, in the Monteregio di Massa Marittima denomination. However, the local DOC is 
not produced - only IGT wines - and only the two top wines are allowed to carry the brand name, Rocca di Frassinello. 
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Brunello di Montalcino: formed 1966 as DOC and received DOCG status in 1980. [100 per cent 
Sangiovese] 
Chianti Classico: previously part of various Chianti DOCs but broke away and got DOCG status in 
1996. [80 per cent Sangiovese] 
Grosseto province DOCs: Morellino di Scansano: DOC 1992 and DOCG beginning with the 2007 
harvest. [85 per cent Sangiovese] 
There are several DOCs in the Grosseto province of recent origin, such as Monteregio di Massa 
Marittima (DOC 1994) and Montecucco (DOC 1998). The new Grosseto DOCs are also 
predominantly Sangoiovese wines. In addition to these three, other new denominations are also 
represented in the sample: Rosso di Sovana, Capalbio and Parrina DOC. 
In addition to these DOC and DOCG we have also included IGT red wines produced in these 
denominations.  
3. Data and modelling 
The data for this study come from the well recognized Italian wine guide I vini de Veronelli which 
is published yearly. It uses a quality scale expected to reveal the taste, perfume and other sensory 
qualities of the wines. The scale is inspired by the one popularized by Robert Parker, although only 
wines in the 80-100 range are reported. The guide provides quality judgments on individual wines, 
as well as retail prices in intervals, maturing techniques, vintage etc. There are a number of well 
known problems in using this type of data. However, it can be argued that wine guides operate in a 
market for serious wine-drinkers and connoisseurs and any systematic bias – as opposed to 
stochastic errors of judgement – would be penalised by market forces. 
Guides do not, however, present an unbiased selection of producers, but concentrate on the 
best in each denomination. We suspect that this selection bias understates the difference in average 
quality between old and new denominations, in that the sample for Brunello di Montalcino and 
Chianti Classico are reasonably representative, while new denominations are represented only by 
their best producers. Nonetheless our data indicate a large difference between Brunello’s average 
score, 91, and that of Grosseto province DOCs, which obtain an average of 87. But as we will point 
out below the average of a representative sample of Grosseto denominations is probably lower. 
Chianti Classico is in-between at 88. We have compared the Veronelli assessment with other guides 
and found a high consensus. 
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Table 1: Estimation 
results The dataset consists of 684 observations of wines. These 
are classified according to quality (from the results in I Vini di 
Veronelli, 2007 edition), denomination (Grosseto3, Morrelino di 
Scansano, Chianti Classico and Brunello di Montalcino), vintage 
(1999-2005) and whether they enjoy IGT or DOC(G) status.  
The intuition of the model can be summarized as follows. 
We argue that the price of a wine is determined by individual 
sensory characteristics as revealed by expert opinion. 
Furthermore there is an independent positive denomination effect 
which is linked to the perceived average quality of a 
denomination. New vintages tend to have a negative impact on 
price because buyers are imposed the cost of cellaring the wines. 
Furthermore, since information about a vintage takes time to get 
diffused there is more uncertainty as to the quality of new 
vintages, and consumers are compensated for that uncertainty by 
a lower price. Finally we expect that IGT wines will have a 
stronger price-quality relationship because consumers cannot 
rely on denomination as a proxy for quality and have to learn 
about the qualities of particular brands or vineyards. The formal 
model is as follows: 
(1) (2)
Constant -34.39 -74.58***
-1.44 -3.29
Quality 0.58** 1.07***
2.14 4.12
IGT -145.25*** -123.58***
-4.92 -4.44
New -3.82 -6.19***
-1.26 -3.08
Chianti -139.37*** -113.67***
-5.31 -4.23
Brunello -63.82 14.79***
-1.32 5.82
q*c 1.68*** 1.33***
5.68 4.33
q*b 0.91*
1.70
i*c -1.29
-1.00
i*b -11.6* -11.5***
-1.85 -3.40
n*c -4.50
-1.18
n*b -2.09
-0.36
q*i 1.67*** 1.43***
5.02 4.48
n*i 1.63
0.32
R^2 0.58 0.58
N 684 684
P-value:
* <10% ** <5% *** <1%
Dependent variable is 
price (€)
All t-values are based on 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors
0 1i iprice quality dummies iβ β ε= + + +  
price is expressed in euros4. Dummies are introduced for the denominations Chianti (which 
stands for Chianti Classico) and Brunello (which stands for Brunello di Montalcino)5, for IGT 
status and for the “new” vintages (2003-05). In addition, interaction terms were introduced for the 
interaction between quality, IGT and vintage and the two denominations Chianti and Brunello  (q*c,  
q*b, i*c, i*b, n*c, n*b); for the interaction between IGT status and quality (q*i); and for the 
interaction between IGT status and vintage (n*i). The reference category is thus a Grosseto of “old” 
vintage without IGT status. iε  is the error term. The model was estimated using OLS, resulting in 
                                                 
3 Which is in fact several independent denominations of very recent origin. 
4 Unfortunately, the price data is not ideal, since the original data is reported in intervals and a simple average has thus 
been used. 
5 Morrelino was grouped with Grosseto at an early stage of the analysis, since the difference between them was found 
to be insignificant. 
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the output shown in column 1 of Table 1. It is clear that several interactions are insignificant6: 
removing them results in the estimates given in column 2. Here all the coefficients are strongly 
significant. The preferred model is therefore: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
i i i i i
i i i i i i i
iprice quality IGT new Chianti Brunello
quality Chianti IGT Brunello quality IGT
β β β β β β
β β β
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ε  
According to the estimates, the price change associated with a one point increase in quality is 
thus 
1 6 8
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1.07 1.33 1.43 0i i i i i
i
price Chianti IGT Chianti IGT
quality
β β β∂ = + ⋅ + ⋅ = + ⋅ + ⋅ >∂  
The increase is thus €1.07 for a Grosseto, €1.07 + €1.33 = €2.40 for a Chianti and €1.43 
greater for any wine, if it enjoys IGT status. The price change associated with IGT status is 
2 7 8
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 123.58 11.5 1.43 0i i i i i
i
price Brunello quality Brunello quality
IGT
β β β∂ = + ⋅ + ⋅ = − − ⋅ + ⋅∂ ≤≥  
This price decreases with IGT status for wines of low quality, but increases for wines of high 
quality. Brunello decreases in price by €11.50 if it has IGT status, in addition to the above. 
The price change associated with a “new” vintage is 
3
ˆ ˆ 6.19i
i
price
new
β∂ = = −∂  
A wine of new vintage is cheaper than one of old vintage by €6.19. This effect is quality 
independent. The price change associated with a Chianti is 
4 6
ˆ ˆ ˆ 113.67 1.33 0i i i
i
price quality quality
Chianti
β β∂ = + ⋅ = − + ⋅ ≤≥∂  
A quality of less than 113.67 85.47
1.33
=  associates a price decrease with Chianti denominations 
compared to Grosseto. In practice this quality is very rare in our sample, so Chianti enjoys a mark-
up compared to Grosseto. This is increasing with quality. 
The price change associated with a Brunello is 
5 7
ˆ ˆ ˆ 14.79 11.5 0i i i
i
price IGT IGT
Brunello
β β∂ = + ⋅ = − ⋅ >∂  
                                                 
6 The price effect of vintage is independent of denomination and IGT status. The price of Chianti is more dependent on 
quality than Grosseto and Brunello, whereas IGT status results in a large reduction in the price of a Brunello. 
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A Brunello thus enjoys a mark-up of €14.79 compared to a Grosseto. However, if the 
Brunello has IGT status, this is reduced to just €3.29. Some implications of our econometric 
analysis are summarized in Table 2, which shows the predicted price, , for various parameter 
values, and the implied mark-up on the price of a Chianti or a Brunello over that of an identical (in 
terms of quality, IGT status and vintage) Grosseto. 89 represents the average quality for the sample. 
ˆprice
Table 2: Some implications of the estimation results 
Vintage
Quality 87 89 91 87 89 91
Grosseto Predicted Price 18.51€    20.65€   22.79€   12.32€   14.46€    16.60€    
Predicted Price 20.55€    25.35€    30.15€    14.36€    19.16€    23.96€    
Mark-up 2.04€      4.70€     7.36€     2.04€     4.70€      7.36€     
Predicted Price 33.30€    35.44€    37.58€    27.11€    29.25€    31.39€    
Mark-up 14.79€    14.79€   14.79€   14.79€   14.79€    14.79€    
Vintage
Quality 87 89 91 87 89 91
Grosseto Predicted Price 19.34€    24.34€   29.34€   13.15€   18.15€    23.15€    
Predicted Price 21.38€    29.04€    36.70€    15.19€    22.85€    30.51€    
Mark-up 2.04€      4.70€     7.36€     2.04€     4.70€      7.36€     
Predicted Price 22.63€    27.63€    32.63€    16.44€    21.44€    26.44€    
Mark-up 3.29€      3.29€     3.29€     3.29€     3.29€      3.29€     
Chianti
Brunello
Predicted Prices and Mark-up over Grosseto
Old New
Old New
IGT
DOC
Brunello
Chianti
4. Interpretation of the results 
Prices respond positively to quality difference as revealed by experts’ evaluations - as we expected. 
Furthermore, the price response to quality changes is much stronger for IGT wines, about € 2.5 per 
quality point for IGT as opposed to € 1.1 for the Grosseto DOC and Montalcino DOCG. This fact 
indicates that the denomination affiliation for a wine can disturb a consumer’s assessment of 
quality. However, Chianti Classico DOCG wines are more price responsive to quality: in fact, they 
are almost as responsive as IGT wines. One possible interpretation is that Chianti Classico 
producers rely more on consumers identifying quality through producers’ characteristics as opposed 
to denomination. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Chianti Classico labels downplay the 
denomination and rather stress producer identification. Wines of new vintages command lower 
prices which can be explained by the fact that knowledge about new vintages is not as widely 
dispersed as for old ones. Information transmission about vintage reputation takes time, since the 
true character of a vintage is not revealed until years after harvest. So buyers of new vintages get a 
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discount for the risk they are taking. Finally, consumers may be willing to pay for buying a wine 
which does not need cellaring. 
There is a significant mark-up on Grosseto DOC for both Chianti Classico and Brunello di 
Montalcino and it is larger for the oldest denomination. The magnitude of the Brunello mark-up is 
almost €15 which is about half of what a good wine guide costs - consumers pay a high price for 
their ignorance. 
The mark-up for Brunello over Chianti Classico is falling as you climb the quality ladder. 
This has to do with the fact that the price is more responsive to quality changes for Chianti Classico, 
as noted above. The price response of a Chianti Classico to a quality change of one unit is €2.4, 
which multiplied by the difference in the average quality between Brunello and Chianti Classico of 
three is €7.2. This corresponds well with the estimated mark-up of about €7.5 at score 91. However, 
if the price offered for a one point increase in quality is ceteris paribus just €1.07, as suggested by 
the regression, then consumers must overestimate the difference between average quality in 
Brunello and Chianti Classico: a mark-up of €7.5 suggests an implied expected quality difference of 
7 points, which is more than twice the true level. We cannot apply the same assessment in 
explaining the Brunello mark-up on Grosseto, almost €15, since we do not know the true average of 
the Grosseto. However, this would imply an expected quality difference of almost 15 points, which 
would suggest that consumers’ perceptions of the average quality is under 80. This is most likely an 
underestimate of the true average, but new denominations might suffer from consumers seriously 
downgrading products they do not know (much) about. Since the media are biased in favour of top 
producers and top average quality denominations it is understandable that consumers’ perceptions 
of quality might systematically downgrade wines with low information exposure. 
The analysis of the mark-up on IGT wines is rewarding and the interpretation is 
straightforward. IGT wines rely more on quality than on denomination reputation since they have 
only a remote association with their producers’ denomination. In other words the positive and 
strong denomination effect that Montalcino enjoys with its Brunello wines disappears. Thus the 
mark-up of IGT wines produced in Montalcino is down to a few euros relative to Grosseto and 
Chianti Classico IGT wines. In fact, at the higher end of the quality scale, Chianti Classico IGT 
fetches a higher price. The fact that Chianti Classico has a positive price differential over Grosseto 
is mainly due to a stronger response of price to quality than for Grosseto and Montalcino.  But the 
effect is that the price difference for a given quality is much smaller for IGT wines.  
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5. Conclusion 
Most of the expectations spelled out in sections 1 and 3 have been confirmed by the empirical 
analysis. There is a significant correlation between price and quality as measured by the scores 
given by experts. The reputational mark-up for Montalcino DOCG wines is substantial and 
dependent on the age of the denomination and the high average quality in the denomination. 
However, the actual quality gap between old and new denominations is probably smaller than the 
perceived gap. Finally, we showed that wines that do not have a denomination affiliation enjoy a 
stronger impact of quality on price. It has been argued that large mark-ups can be compatible with 
the assumption of rational consumer behaviour given that there are high search costs. We observe, 
however, that the magnitude of the mark-up amounts to about half the price of a reputable wine 
guide. Serious and rational wine-drinkers should pay a visit to the book-shop before they enter the 
bottle-shop. 
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